In banking partnership contracts, economic activity takes place between the bank and the customer. In this activity, the bank seeks to bear less risk, and what is implemented in banks as these contracts is different from what the legislator has called partnership. In order to achieve their goal, which is to reduce risk for their own benefit, banks sometimes include conditions that are contrary to the essence of the partnership contract, that is, conditions that conflict with the customer's real intention, in the partnership contract, and sometimes they upset the balance of the contract by adding unfair conditions that apparently follow the principle of correctness and are concluded based on correct contractual principles, but inwardly they are considered imposed conditions and the customer has inevitably agreed to accept them. Therefore, the acceptance of such conditions by the customer undermines the principle of justice and creates distrust between economic actors and banks, and as a result, corruption in the monetary and banking system. Therefore, it seems that banks do not have the structural and functional capabilities in accordance with Islamic and legal requirements. The present study, by examining the raised objections, examines these conditions and their examples in banking contracts and offers solutions to improve and overcome the current situation in banking partnership contracts. For example, instead of including conditions that are contrary to the nature of the partnership contract or unfair conditions in banking partnership contracts, by specializing banks that have the ability to monitor and perform better in these contracts in these areas, and by phasing the allocation of profits in partnership contracts, the risk of banks is reduced and the banking model is improved in this regard